Biofuel Incentives and the Energy Title of the 2007 Farm Bill by Miranowski, John A
Economics Publications Economics
5-17-2007
Biofuel Incentives and the Energy Title of the 2007
Farm Bill
John A. Miranowski
Iowa State University, jmirski@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Economic Theory Commons,
Growth and Development Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, and the Regional
Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/567. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
           1   
Biofuel Incentives and the Energy Title of the 2007 Farm Bill 
John A. Miranowski∗
∗ Professor of Economics and Director, Institute of Science and Society, Iowa State 
University, Ames. Prepared for American Enterprise Institute project, Agricultural Policy 
for the 2007 Farm Bill and Beyond, directed by Bruce Gardner and Daniel A. Sumner.  
The author would like to thank Jittinan Aukuyanagul, Alicia Irons, and Xiaomei Hao for 
research assistance on this project. The views expressed here are those of the author and 
not those of any institution with which he is affiliated.  
                                                                                                                                          2   
 
Introduction 
 
Given the increased interest in biofuels and other biorenewables, a separate Energy Title 
is being considered for the 2007 Farm Bill.  The added benefits and costs of such 
government intervention need to be weighed carefully.  The United States has conducted 
an interesting social experiment with ethanol over the last three decades.  The federal 
government and some state governments have provided incentives to increase both corn 
grain ethanol production and consumption to improve local air quality, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, and provide a substitute fuel from renewable resource that 
could serve to improve energy security.  The experiment was successful, but in large part 
because the price of crude oil increased.  Pushing this experiment further will eventually 
lead the added costs to outweigh the added benefits. Further expansion is typically 
justified on grounds of moving to biomass-based ethanol, which is purported to have 
even greater environmental and development benefits. The simple breakeven analyses 
presented in this paper seriously question the potential of biomass ethanol as a 
sustainable biofuel source.   
 
Ethanol and Other Biofuels 
 
Biofuel is a liquid form of biomass that can be used as a fuel.  It is a renewable energy 
source that can be used to substitute for petroleum imports, improve oxygenate levels and 
air quality, and reduce the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere.   
The most commonly used biofuel is ethanol.  In the United States, the primary 
feedstock for ethanol is corn grain.  Eventually, biomass may be used to supplement corn 
grain as an ethanol feedstock, once cost-competitive enzymatic processes are developed 
for breaking the cellulose fibers in corn stover, grasses, and woody plants into component 
sugars. Other conversion processes are also under development, such as producing bio-
gas or bio-oil and refining the product into a biofuel (such as bio-butanol). 
Optimistically, such technologies will not be available on a commercial scale before 
2015.   
The use of ethanol as a transportation fuel in the United States can be traced to 
Henry Ford’s 1908 Model T, which was designed to run either on ethanol or gasoline. 
The use of ethanol as a fuel substitute increased during World War II, but decreased after 
the war when the available supply of crude oil increased and petroleum prices declined.  
The interest in ethanol as a transportation fuel was revived in the 1970s with oil supply 
disruptions from the Middle East.  Incentive programs to encourage ethanol use began 
with the 1978 Energy Act and the road use tax credit on ethanol blended with gasoline.  
Ethanol demand increased with the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990s), which mandated 
the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) and oxygenated fuels in regions with serious 
mobile source air quality problems.  Other incentives were created in the late 1990s to 
assist ethanol producers facing high feedstock costs. These incentives were formalized 
and expanded in the Rural Development Title of the 2002 Farm Bill.  
Adding ethanol raises the octane and oxygen levels of gasoline, making the 
engine run smoother and cleaner and reducing the demand for other additives or further 
gasoline refining.  Ethanol is certified for use as a 10 percent mixture with gasoline in 
conventional gasoline engines and up to an 85 percent mixture of ethanol with gasoline 
(E-85) in “flex fuel” engines in the United States.   
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   Large-scale U.S. commercial production of flex fuel vehicles began in 1997. 
Initially, the use of E-85 grew slowly because gasoline prices were sufficiently low that 
subsidized ethanol was not a cost competitive fuel substitute for gasoline. Lack of E-85 
fueling stations (except in Minnesota, which provides incentives for E-85 fueling 
stations) has further hindered adoption, even when subsidized ethanol is more cost 
competitive.   
Demand for ethanol has also increased because it serves as a substitute for another 
compound, methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE), which raises the oxygen content of gasoline.  
In 2001, California discovered residues of MTBE in surface water. By 2005, twenty 
states had banned MTBE use. When the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct 2005) did not 
include a producer waiver of liability for MTBE damage to water quality, the demand for 
ethanol as a substitute increased and MTBE use is being phased out.  
Biodiesel is a liquid fuel with combustion properties similar to petroleum diesel 
fuel. It can be made from vegetable oil, animal fat, or recycled grease, through a 
transesterification process where methanol is used to convert base oil into methyl ester. In 
the United States, biodiesel is primarily produced from soy oil, animal fat, and waste 
cooking oil.  
As an alternative fuel, biodiesel is used alone (B100) or in a blend with diesel fuel 
in formulations of 2, 5, or 20 percent biodiesel (B2, B5, and B20) without modifying 
conventional diesel engines.  Adding biodiesel raises lubricity of ultra-low sulfur diesel 
(ULSD), preventing damage in older diesel engines. Since sulfur acts as a lubricant, 
lowering its content leads to a drop in lubricity of diesel fuel. ULSD is an EPA 
requirement under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to reduce harmful emissions 
from diesel fuel beginning in 2006.   Currently, biodiesel is the only diesel fuel additive 
that meets the Health Effects Testing requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments.1     
 
The Costs and Benefits of Policy Intervention:  A Qualitative Look 
 
There are three main arguments for expanded biofuel production.  
  
• Energy security.  U.S. reliance on oil imports has been increasing as the economy 
has expanded.  In 2006, approximately 60 percent of U.S. oil that was consumed was 
imported.  Although about 30 percent of U.S. oil imports come from Canada and Mexico, 
a significant share of U.S. oil imports come from more unstable parts of the world.  The 
federal policy perspective is that these “less reliable suppliers” create a threat to the U.S. 
economy and national security.  Advocates of biofuel argue that substituting more 
“reliable” biofuel sources for imported oil will reduce the risk of foreign energy supply 
disruptions.  
• Environmental quality.  Since biofuels are derived from living plant matter, 
substituting them for petroleum could reduce the net amount of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases (GHG) released into the atmosphere.  There are other environmental 
considerations regarding ethanol, as well. In addition to reducing GHG and carbon 
dioxide emissions, blending ethanol with gasoline reduces carbon monoxide and volatile 
organic compounds that are harmful local and regional air emissions.  The Clean Air Act 
                                                 
1 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 includes a tax subsidy similar to the ethanol tax subsidy for plant and 
animal oils used in biodiesel production.  Virgin oils—that is, plant-derived oils not previously used—
receive a $1.00/gal excise tax credit, and recycled plant oils and animal fats receive a $0.50/gal credit. 
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Amendments (1990) were designed specifically to address carbon monoxide and other 
harmful emissions, and mandated the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) and oxygenated 
fuels in regions with serious mobile source air quality problems. Such air quality 
problems include smog and higher concentrations of carbon monoxide in urban areas, 
which have deleterious impacts on human health. 
• Reduced federal budget exposure.  Currently in the United States, the most 
competitive and predominant feedstock for biofuel production is corn grain.  The derived 
demand for corn as a biofuel feedstock is closely linked to the price of crude oil (see 
discussion below).  As the price of crude oil increases, the price that ethanol producers 
can afford to pay for corn increases.  Higher corn prices result in reduced government 
commodity program payments to corn and soybean producers.  Additionally, new job 
creation for rural biofuel production may ultimately reduce budget exposure in rural 
development programs.   At the same time, every additional gallon of ethanol that is 
blended receives a $0.51 per gallon tax subsidy (the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit, 
or VEETC), which may offset any reduction in commodity program payments.          
 
There are three questions to consider when making a case for government 
intervention.   First, do the added benefits of government intervention into biofuel 
markets outweigh the added costs of intervention?  Second, if the government intervenes 
in energy and biofuels markets, what are the economic arguments for intervention and 
what are more efficient and less distorting policy options for intervention?  Third, what 
are the economic impacts of different forms of government intervention and what are the 
implications for biofuel and energy markets? 
Calculation of the benefits and costs of government intervention in biofuel 
markets is complicated by the diverse nature of benefits. The three arguments considered 
above for government intervention are: improved energy security, environmental quality, 
and federal budget exposure.  Although it is difficult to place a value on improved energy 
security, corn ethanol supplies less than 4 percent of the 142 billion gallons of gasoline 
currently consumed. All biofuels supply about 3 percent of the 200 billion gallons of 
motor fuel consumed.2  Even if 14 to 15 billion gallons of biofuel were consumed in the 
United States by 2015, that would account for 10 percent of gasoline consumption and 6–
7 percent of U.S. motor fuel consumption.   
Using biofuel does reduce carbon dioxide and GHG emissions relative to 
petroleum and other fossil fuels. Estimates of reduction in GHG emissions from using 
corn-based ethanol rather than petroleum as a transportation fuel are about 12−13 percent 
(Farrell and others 2006; Hill and others 2007) and about 20 percent for carbon (Kopp 
2006).3  The actual reduction in GHG emissions from substituting corn-based ethanol as a 
transportation fuel may, in part, be offset by increased application of energy-based inputs 
in corn production in response to higher market prices for corn.   
Biomass-based ethanol—although currently not a competitive fuel source—could 
reduce GHG emissions by even greater amounts frequently estimated from 80 to over 90 
percent (Hill and others 2007). Biomass production is purported to use significantly less 
fertilizer nutrients and biomass refineries to use significantly less natural gas than corn-
                                                 
2DOE, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2005, tables 1.3 and 2.1A, July 2006, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html
3 Greater reductions are referred to by Shelby (2007)—a 26 percent reduction in GHG emissions with corn-
based ethanol and McCarl (2007) —43 percent reduction in carbon with corn-based ethanol used in their 
modeling efforts. 
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based ethanol plants. Yet we found no published studies that provide a comprehensive 
accounting of all the energy used and energy costs of producing ethanol and other biofuel 
from biomass resources. Notably, to get competitive biomass yields may require more 
fertilization than many biomass research studies have indicated.  More importantly, 
harvesting, transporting, handling, and storing biomass are energy-inefficient operations, 
given current technology.4
The federal government has been spending $20 to 30 billion on annual farm 
program payments. If historically high corn and soybean prices prevail, only the direct 
and countercyclical payment components are anticipated for these two commodities, and 
some groups have proposed eliminating these payments as well. The decreased payments 
reduce federal government budget exposure (while also improving compliance with U.S. 
commitments under international trade agreements through the World Trade 
Organization). At the same time, every gallon of fuel ethanol receives the $0.51 tax 
subsidy (VEETC).  In 2006, the VEETC effectively cost the government $2.5 billion. If                     
the ethanol industry expands production to 14−15 billion gallons annually, the tax 
subsidy will increase to $7.0–$7.5 billion per year.  This discussion implicitly assumes 
that there is an economic rationale for transfer payments to farmers (agricultural 
landowners) and ethanol producers. In reality, these issues are more political objectives 
than social welfare maximization objectives.  
What are the costs of biofuel expansion?  In addition to budget costs, biofuel 
expansion may involve a number of other costs. As corn acreage increases in response to 
higher corn prices and increased ethanol production, nutrient use and soil loss will likely 
increase. Corn acreage will be pushed to more erosion-prone soils, more erosive practices 
may be used in corn production, and the derived demand for fertilizer nutrients will 
increase. Nutrients and sediment from soil leaching and runoff are the two major sources 
of water quality deterioration originating in Midwest agricultural areas.  Further, use of 
more nutrients and more erosive production practices will reduce or eliminate the GHG 
emission reduction associated with corn grain ethanol. The Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) was designed to remove highly erodible land from production to reduce 
soil erosion, lessen water quality damages, and provide enhanced wildlife and recreation 
benefits. Landowners receive annual payments for 10 years to retire qualifying lands. As 
the opportunity cost of maintaining land in the CRP increases (that is, the return from 
growing corn increases), many CRP contracts will not be renewed when they expire and 
water quality and wildlife benefits will be lost (Heimlich 2007; Kuminoff 2007).  
Livestock groups have argued for releasing CRP acres under contract for corn 
production. Their rationale is that the increased corn supply will decrease corn prices and 
therefore drive down livestock feed costs. Although such an approach may have a small 
short-run impact on corn prices, in the longer run the price of gasoline and the VEETC 
are the major determinants of what ethanol producers can pay for a bushel of corn, and 
thus the price that livestock producers will have to pay for corn (Brester and Smith 2007). 
A frequently cited benefit of the ethanol boom in the Midwest is rural 
development. The corn ethanol industry creates well-paying jobs in rural communities, 
which have local income and job multiplier impacts that ultimately lead to community 
development. It is argued that these community benefits may be further enhanced by 
local investment as opposed to outside investment (Miranowski and Andrian 2007).  As 
                                                 
4Iowa State University, “Switchgrass Fact Sheet,” Department of Agronomy, Ames (February 2007).  
www.agron.iastate.edu. 
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the industry grows, these potential benefits are becoming less significant for a number of 
reasons.  First, earlier dry mill plants (2000) were smaller, employed more workers per 
unit of capacity, had a larger share of local investment, and had a minor impact on local 
corn markets and livestock feed costs.  Today, new dry mill ethanol plants have increased 
annual production capacity from under 40 million gallons to over 100 million gallons. 
New plants employ fewer than 0.5 workers per million gallons capacity, whereas earlier 
plants employed up to 2.5 workers per million gallons capacity.  Roughly 40 percent of 
ownership in older Iowa ethanol plants was local, but today relatively little investment in 
new plants is local (Miranowski and Imerman 2007).  Recent reports place current 
majority Iowa ownership in Iowa ethanol plants at 34 percent.5  
For the Midwest and the United States, the added benefits of ethanol industry 
expansion have exceeded the added costs of industry expansion to date. A 5 billion gallon 
corn ethanol industry has significant benefits relative to costs.  The corn ethanol industry 
has demonstrated that biofuel can make a modest contribution in meeting air quality 
requirements, GHG emission reductions, improved energy security, and shifting farm 
program payments to ethanol tax subsidies. Such industry expansion can also bring about 
local economic development without destructive impacts on livestock industry growth 
and the quality of the rural landscape.   
Continued expansion of the corn ethanol industry will add benefits, but 
eventually, the added costs will exceed added benefits. It is uncertain at what ethanol 
output level will the added benefits exceed the added costs. Additional expansion will 
create less new employment per unit of capacity and may eventually create a net job loss. 
Ethanol industry expansion and higher corn prices will disrupt livestock production 
activities and may displace more livestock employment than jobs created in the ethanol 
industry.  Significant expansion of the biofuel industry will also lead to higher food 
prices and change trade flows, with the United States ultimately becoming a net importer 
of corn (El Obeid and others 2006).   
Continued industry expansion may have environmental costs in addition to those 
mentioned above. Some local groundwater supplies may be drawn down and 
groundwater consumption may be disrupted in some areas.  Although corn ethanol has 
helped meet certain Clean Air Act Amendment requirements, further expansion of the 
industry may contribute to decreased GHG emission reductions as more intensive 
production practices and more erosion-prone lands are used to produce corn. 
Also, it is important to remember that all the current forms of government 
intervention in the ethanol (biofuel) market were in place before 2000.  It was not a 
change in government biofuel or energy policy that caused the expansion after 2000. 
Rather, the important factor that is driving the future market for ethanol is the price of 
crude oil or gasoline. Ethanol is becoming the substitute fuel of choice.  At current crude 
oil prices, ethanol processors can pay over $4 per bushel for corn and still break even.  
Under current and crude oil future market prices, the ethanol industry is in a position to 
support large-scale biofuel expansion.  
  On balance, do the benefits of biofuel incentives outweigh the costs?  From an 
energy security perspective, ethanol can contribute only 10 percent to the gasoline fuel 
supply because the current fleet of automobiles is composed primarily of conventional 
gasoline engines.  In 2006 the United States consumed about 142 billion gallons of 
                                                 
5Paula Lavigne, “As Industry Branches Out, Outside Investment Flows In,” Des Moines Register, Sunday, 
April 29, 2007, p.3 ET. www.desmoinesregister.com. 
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gasoline.6 If all the gasoline were blended with 10 percent ethanol, about 14 billion 
gallons of ethanol would have been used. To go beyond a 10 percent ethanol blend will 
require the necessary stock of flex fuel vehicles and readily available E85 fueling 
facilities in the United States. Currently, only 5 million flex fuel vehicles are on U.S. 
roads and less than a thousand fueling stations are offering E85.7  
A more basic economic question needs to be addressed with respect to economic 
policy and the welfare impacts of biofuel incentives.  If our policy objectives are to 
improve energy security and reduce dependence on foreign oil, reduce GHG emissions, 
and reduce federal budget exposure on farm commodity and rural development programs, 
what is the least distorting or least-cost approach to achieve these objectives? If our 
objective in energy and bioenergy policy intervention is to maximize social welfare, we 
must accomplish that in the most efficient way possible, considering all the social costs 
and benefits of intervention. 
The economic response to the GHG emissions reduction objective would be a tax 
on petroleum and other fossil fuels equal to the marginal value of the negative 
externalities created by GHG emissions costs.  Alternatively, we could establish a cap 
and trade system for carbon emissions and let the private sector pursue the least-cost way 
of achieving a given reduction in carbon emissions. By letting the private sector find the 
least-cost solution, resources would be allocated more efficiently in achieving the GHG 
emissions reduction.  Our nation has not demonstrated the political will to tax petroleum 
and other fossil fuel sources or create a cap and trade system, except in the case of sulfur 
emissions from power plants.  Similar provisions could be used in the case of energy 
security costs. A tax on petroleum and other fossil fuels would increase conservation, 
reduce imports, and improve energy security.   
Historically, the United States has pursued a “cheap energy” policy through the 
use of extensive tax subsidies to the fossil fuel energy sector, including many provisions 
contained in Energy Policy Act of 2005.  In the ongoing policy effort to maintain low 
petroleum fuel prices, petroleum prices do not serve as an effective signaling mechanism 
for alternative energy and biofuel markets to develop substitute fuels.  Instead, 
policymakers have chosen selected fuel forms—such as ethanol and biodiesel, or electric 
cars in California—to receive tax subsidies and mandates in an effort to create a “more 
level playing field” relative to petroleum fuels.   
Even if the nation chooses to pursue second best policy options, some second best 
options may be less inefficient than other options.  For example, since there is not a  
“silver bullet” to solve the “energy problem,” a more efficient solution would be to 
provide comparable tax subsidies to all forms of low carbon or renewable fuels, including 
hydrogen and nuclear energy.  Alternatively, renewable fuel mandates could include all 
forms of renewable fuels and the market could determine which forms of renewable fuels 
would achieve the mandate at least cost. Such approaches would stimulate more efficient 
and competitive fuel forms to be developed and marketed, would encourage adoption of 
carbon reduction technologies in refining and processing petroleum and other fossil fuels, 
                                                 
6 DOE, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2005, tables 1.3 and 2.1A, July 2006, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html.
7 James M. Flamang, 2006, “E85: Flex-Fuel Vehicles: Are They Corny?”  
http:/www.valvoline.com/carcare/articlereviewer.asp?pg=dsm2006050185&cccid=3&scccid=6  (accessed 
5/2/2007);  U.S. Department of Energy, 2007, “E85 Stations in the United States,” Alternative Fuels Data 
Center, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/infrastructure/e85_stations.cgi. (accessed 5/2/07).  
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and would encourage different fuel utilization technologies from improved internal 
combustion engines to electric and hydrogen powered vehicles.  The alternative—having 
policymakers and the government “pick the winners”—is not an efficient alternative. 
As a second best solution, Kopp (2006) argues, “Subsidies and mandates are 
better suited to commercialization, while policies focusing on R&D are better suited [to] 
pre-commercialization.”  More typically, both forms of incentives are provided to new 
technologies.  For example, for the recent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) grants to six 
cellulosic-ethanol biorefineries, grant recipients will receive up to $80 million each to 
research, develop, and commercialize cellulosic ethanol.8 In addition, the VEETC 
provides a $0.51 per gallon tax subsidy to all fuel ethanol producers including cellulosic 
ethanol. In some cases, biomass production subsidies are being sought as well.9
In weighing various policy alternatives, it is useful to have a good understanding 
of recent biofuel market developments, and the basic demand and supply relationship in 
the biofuel market. The next section explores the recent explosion in ethanol and other 
biofuel production. The following section considers the underlying demand and supply 
relationships in the ethanol market and derives empirical estimates of short-run ethanol 
demand and supply and long-run equilibrium prices for corn and biomass feedstocks.  
 
Recent and Projected Ethanol and Biofuel Production 
 
Ethanol output has continued to expand every year since 1980—with the exception of 
1995, when corn grain prices were at record levels (figure 1). Ethanol output has been 
expanding rapidly and by the end of 2007 is expected to exceed the 2012 Renewable 
Fuels Standard (RFS) of 7.5 billion gallons established in the 2005 Energy Policy Act.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), “DOE Selects Six Cellulosic Ethanol Plants for Up to $385 Million 
in Federal Funding,” February 28, 2007.  http://www.energy.gov/news/4827.htm (retrieved March 22, 
2007); Service (2007). 
 
9 Philip Brasher, “Likely Hurdles Include Storage, Harvesting,” Des Moines Register, Sunday, March 18, 
p.4 ET.  www.desmoinesregister.com.  
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Figure 1. 
Ethanol Production
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Source: Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics: Historic U.S. Fuel Ethanol 
Production.” http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#A   
 
Similar developments on a much smaller scale are occurring in biodiesel 
production, where capacity increased from 15 million gallons in 2004 to over 200 million 
gallons by the end of 2006.  As illustrated in figure 2, biodiesel production has grown 
rapidly since 2000, but the potential for biodiesel expansion may be constrained to less 
than 1 billion gallons by availability of feedstock and the opportunity cost of shifting corn 
acreage to oilseed production. 
 
Figure 2 
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Source: Soy Stats, “Domestic Utilization: U.S. Biodiesel Consumption.” 
http://www.soystats.com/2007/Default-frames.htm 
 
Several incentives, including air quality regulations in the Clean Air Act Amendments, 
1990, the phase out of MTBE without a liability waiver in the EPA Act of 2005, higher 
crude oil prices, state ethanol mandates, federal and state tax credits and other tax 
incentives, and federal and state grant and loan programs have played a part in the past 
expansion of the biofuel market.  As noted in figure 3, the Renewable Fuels Standard is 
being outpaced by biofuel industry expansion, and thus the RFS is essentially becoming 
redundant. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush called for a 35 billion gallon 
renewable fuels mandate for 2017, with substantial quantities of biofuel derived from 
biomass feedstocks.10  As the discussion that follows shows, achieving such a mandate 
may have significant economic costs and benefits associated with it.  
 
Figure 3 
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Source: Renewable Fuels Association,  “Renewable Fuels Standard. 
http://www.ethanol.rfa.org/resources/standard/ 
 
Currently, the primary feedstock for ethanol is corn grain. Over 13 percent of the 
2005 U.S. corn crop was used as ethanol feedstock, and over 25 percent of the 2009 corn 
crop could be utilized in ethanol production. Corn prices have nearly doubled in the last 
year alone and corn futures contract prices for deliveries into 2010 are over $4.00 per 
bushel. Public concerns are being expressed over the growing competition between food, 
feed, and fuel. Livestock producers are concerned over disruptions in livestock markets, 
humanitarian groups over potential increases in global food prices, malnourishment, and 
Recent and Projected Production to Meet the 
Ren wable Fuels Stand r , 2006-2017 
                                                 
10White House, President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address, January 23, 2007.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html (retrieved March 22, 2007).   
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hunger, and environmental interests over increased water quality and greenhouse gas 
emission problems.     
The 2007 Farm Bill will be developed in an environment similar to the 1996 farm 
legislation, providing interesting challenges and opportunities to redirect commodity 
titles, as well as to redefine energy, conservation, and trade titles.  We are entering this 
Farm Bill era with higher commodity prices, reflecting increased demand for corn grain 
for biofuel production.  Farmers are receiving the same prices for corn grain that feeders 
and processors are willing to pay: that is, prices above target loan rates.  Thus loan 
deficiency payments will not be required to make up the difference between market price 
and the target loan rate, and countercyclical payments will also decrease. The resulting 
reduced commodity program payments will reduce the federal budget exposure.  
However, various interest groups are hoping to redirect some of the anticipated budget 
savings to a redefined energy title. 
 
Demand and Supply Analyses of the Biofuel (Ethanol) Market 
 
Basic Ethanol Demand and Supply Relationships. Before evaluating the impacts of 
existing and proposed biofuel provisions of the Farm Bill Energy Title, it is useful to 
review the basic demand and supply relationships in the biofuel (ethanol) market.  The 
discussion will focus on ethanol biofuel because the market is established, has been the 
beneficiary of government intervention at least since 1978, and has an established 
database for empirical observation.  The market concepts and government interventions 
are easily extendable to biodiesel and other biofuel.  
The determinants of ethanol demand include ethanol price, gasoline price, gross 
domestic product, and government regulations and incentive.  Consider how different 
regulations and incentives impact the market demand for ethanol: 
 
• Demand for ethanol as oxygenate.  Government regulations such as the Clean Air 
Act Amendments beginning in 1995 required winter-time use of oxygenated fuels in 39 
major regions that had not attained the carbon monoxide standard and year-round 
oxygenated fuels use in 9 regions that had severe difficulties attaining the ozone standard. 
These government requirements or mandates in large part determined the demand for 
oxygenated fuels. Because ethanol had a competitive substitute, MTBE, that could be 
used to meet the oxygenate requirement, the demand for ethanol was rather elastic.  
When MTBE was banned in several states and producer liability protection was not 
included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the demand for ethanol as an oxygenate had 
no close substitutes and the demand for ethanol as an oxygenate was essentially fixed 
(vertical) at any point in time, as depicted in figure 4.  
 
• Demand for ethanol as octane enhancer.  Legislation was passed in 1973 to 
completely phase out an octane enhancer, tetraethyl lead, in gasoline by 1995.  Adding 
ethanol raises the octane level of unleaded gasoline without the use of other additives or 
the need for further gasoline refining.  The widely used blend E10 (10 percent ethanol 
and 90 percent gasoline) raises the octane rating of unleaded regular gasoline by 2 points, 
to super unleaded gasoline, with an octane level of 89.  Since conventional gasoline 
engines are certified to operate on E10 without modification, the demand for ethanol as 
octane enhancer is relatively elastic (figure 4). 
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• Demand for ethanol as a fuel substitute.  When used in a conventional gasoline 
engine, a gallon of ethanol has approximately 67 percent of the Btu’s of a gallon of 
gasoline.11  By far the largest potential market for ethanol is as a fuel substitute for 
gasoline.  Total ethanol production was 5 billion gallons in 2006, or less than 4 percent of 
the gasoline market.  Even if all gasoline were blended with 10 percent ethanol (E10), the 
United States could currently use only about 14 billion gallons of ethanol per year.  Thus 
the demand for ethanol as a fuel substitute is depicted as a horizontal line in figure 4. As 
the stock of flex fuel engines expands and the availability of E-85 fueling sites increases, 
ethanol could have a more significant market impact and the ethanol demand as a fuel 
substitute would then be more downward sloping.   
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The total demand for ethanol is shown as the bold line in figure 4.  We are 
assuming that the demand for ethanol beyond environmental requirements, fuel 
standards, and use mandates is the derived demand for ethanol as a fuel substitute for 
gasoline.  Although demand for ethanol as a fuel substitute is not quite perfectly elastic, 
we are assuming that the gasoline market will absorb up to 14 billion gallons of ethanol 
(that is, conventional gasoline engine constraint) at roughly 67 percent of the price of 
gasoline.   
Ethanol supply is a function of feedstock cost, other input costs, output price, tax 
subsidies, investment incentives, and technology.  How do biofuel incentives shift the 
supply curve?  
 
ethanolPethanolP   
total
ethanolD  
oxygenateD  
Dsubstitue
eocD tan
ethanolQ  ethanolQ  
Figure 4: Total and Component Demands for Ethanol Biofuel 
                                                 
11 Flexible fuel engines can achieve 70 to 80 percent of gasoline’s Btu value from ethanol because they are 
programmed to optimize the use of different fuel mixtures (Brown 2003). 
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• Ethanol tax credit.  The volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC) is available 
to firms that blend ethanol with gasoline.  The current tax credit is $0.51 per gallon 
ethanol blended.  The $0.51 per gallon shifts the supply curve to the right.  The 
perception of the ethanol industry is that most, if not all, of this tax credit is shifted 
backward to ethanol producers, and ultimately, to corn growers and landowners.12  
• Investment incentives. A variety of incentive programs exist to stimulate 
investment in the biofuel industry.  Such programs are available through the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Office of Rural Development, state economic 
development agencies, and local development efforts.  The federal government makes 
grants and subsidized, guaranteed, and forgivable loans. State and local entities may use 
grants and loans, but also use tax abatement and infrastructure (such as roads, water) and 
employment incentives that are designed to promote local economic growth.  
 
In an effort to evaluate the potential market impacts and the benefits and costs of 
government intervention in the biofuel (ethanol) market, we estimated an econometric 
model of the U.S. ethanol market. The model and results of the estimation are contained 
in the appendix to this paper. 
Even though our model performs reasonably well, the supply model is not useful 
in assessing Farm Bill initiatives designed to change the supply of biofuel.  Given the 
dramatic expansion in the ethanol industry, changes in ethanol industry structure, and 
significant technology change over the last five years, a supply curve based on historical 
data is not reflective of current industry conditions and greatly underestimates the 
potential for expansion in supply.  Instead of deriving the supply curve and estimating 
market equilibrium conditions from time series econometric analysis, we use an approach 
that has been adopted by previous studies that used breakeven analyses to evaluate long-
run biofuel investment decisions and the potential for ethanol supply expansion under 
different assumptions of input, output, and incentive prices.13
 
Long-Run Equilibrium (Breakeven) Analysis for Corn-based Ethanol. Using a long- 
run equilibrium (breakeven) analysis, the basic question that we address is, “How much 
could a modern ethanol plant pay for a bushel of corn and still break even under current 
market, incentive, and cost assumptions in the long run?”  Although this approach does 
not provide a direct estimate of long-run equilibrium ethanol quantity and price, it does 
provide the breakeven price for the last bushel of corn, taking all other ethanol supply 
costs into account. Additionally, since we have assumed that demand for ethanol as a fuel 
substitute is highly elastic within our range of consideration, we can implicitly derive the 
equilibrium price of ethanol from the price of gasoline and crude oil.  We can then draw 
on results from a global agricultural model to determine the amount of corn available to 
the ethanol industry at the breakeven price, how related markets may adjust and be 
impacted, the “equilibrium” quantity of ethanol that would be supplied in the long run, 
and how related markets and trade-flows may be impacted (El Obeid and others 2006).  
To determine the breakeven price of corn, we derive the market price for ethanol 
from gasoline and crude oil.  We then add tax credits and octane benefits.  Returns per 
gallon are multiplied by the conversion (yield) ratio to determine the returns per bushel. 
                                                 
 
13 See, for example, USDA, ERS (1988); Tiffany and Eidman (2003); Eidman 2005; El Obeid and others  
(2006). 
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Distillers dried grain solubles (DDGS) value is added and the operating and capital costs 
per bushel of corn are subtracted to determine the breakeven price that the biorefinery can 
pay for the last bushel of corn.   
 
The following equation formalizes this relationship:  
Pcorn = YE [(Pgas) (0.67) + VO + TVEETC – CV – CK] + VDDGS        (6) 
where 
Pcorn = Price of corn grain per bushel 
YE = Ethanol yield per bushel corn 
Pgas = Price of gasoline per gallon 
VO = Octane enhancement value per gasoline gallon 
TVEETC = Volumetric ethanol excise tax credit 
CV = Non-corn variable cost per gallon 
CK = Capital cost per gallon 
VDDGS = Value of DDGS per bushel of corn 
 
We assume an ethanol yield of 2.8 gallons per bushel of corn; a $60 per barrel 
crude oil, which converts to a gasoline price of $2.10 per gallon;14 octane value of $0.05 
per gallon; VEETC of $0.51 per gallon ethanol blended; capital cost of $0.32 per gallon; 
non-corn operating cost of $0.50 per gallon;15 and DDGS value of $1.02 per bushel of 
corn.  Under these assumptions, the long-run equilibrium breakeven price for corn is 
$4.21 per bushel for a modern, 100 million gallon per year ethanol plant.  This equation 
can be further manipulated to evaluate the sensitivity of the corn breakeven price to 
changes in the values of right-hand side parameters.  
The Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) used a similar 
breakeven analysis in 2006 and calculated a $4.07/bu corn breakeven price (El Obeid and 
others  2006). The authors then perturbed the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute’s global FAPRI model to determine how much corn would be utilized for 
ethanol feedstock at the long-run market equilibrium price and what adjustments would 
occur in domestic and national food, feed, and livestock markets.  Although no timeframe 
was established to attain equilibrium, they projected that the United States would use 
more than 10 billion bushels of corn to produce more than 30 billion gallons of ethanol 
per year at long-run equilibrium. 
 
Long-run Equilibrium (Breakeven) Analysis for Biomass Ethanol. A similar 
breakeven analysis per ton of biomass can be developed to evaluate incentive provisions 
for biomass feedstock and ethanol production.  The breakeven approach in this case is 
viewed from the perspective of both the biomass processor and the biomass producer or 
supplier. First, what is the breakeven price that the biomass processor will pay for a ton 
of biomass to convert into biofuel? Second, what is the breakeven price that a biomass 
producer will accept for the last dry ton of biomass delivered to the ethanol plant?  This 
approach can be used to compare the relative competitiveness of different biomass 
feedstock, including the opportunity cost of shifting cropping practices on agricultural 
                                                 
14 The Btu-equivalent factor of ethanol for gasoline is 0.667 (Brown 2003), or when gasoline is $2.10 per 
gallon (or crude oil is $60 per barrel), ethanol is valued at roughly  $1.40 per gallon.  
15 To evaluate capital and operating costs, we analyzed a $200 million dollar plant with yield capacity of 
100 million gallons of ethanol per year.  Amortizing over 10 years at an interest rate of 10 percent yields 
capital costs of $0.32 per gallon. Operating cost was estimated to be $0.50 per gallon. 
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land and biomass research areas offering higher potential returns to investment in 
biomass-based fuels.   
 
The following equation formalizes the biomass breakeven relationship for the biomass 
processor:  
Ppbiomass = [(Pgas) (0.67) + TVEETC + VO - CK + CV] (YE)       (7) 
where   
 
Ppbiomass  = Price of biomass per dry ton 
Pgas = Gasoline price per gallon 
TVEETC = Volumetric ethanol excise tax credit  per gallon 
VO = Octane enhancement value per gasoline gallon 
YE = Ethanol yield per dry ton of biomass 
CK = Capital cost per gallon 
CV = Operating cost per gallon 
 
As an illustration, we calculate the breakeven price/ton for corn stover that the 
processor can pay. Using the same energy price assumptions as in equation 6—$60 per 
barrel expected crude oil price, $2.10 per gallon wholesale gasoline price, the $1.40 per 
gallon equivalent price of ethanol, continuation of the $0.51 per gallon VEETC—and an 
ethanol yield of 70 gallons per dry ton biomass (stover),16 equals total revenue of $132 
per dry ton of biomass.17  Assuming the non-biomass cost (that is, capital and variable 
costs)18 of converting corn stover to ethanol of $55 per ton, the plant would have net 
returns of $78 per ton.  It is important to note that these cost estimates are based on 
engineering studies and are essentially synthetic data.  These data should be a good 
indicator of the price that a commercial biomass conversion plant would be able to pay 
the producer for the last ton of biomass produced, harvested, stored, and delivered to the 
plant.   
Table 1 provides the long-run equilibrium corn stover price for a series of crude 
oil prices with and without the tax credit.  
 
 
Table 1. Long-run Corn Stover Breakeven Prices (dollars)  
Crude oil 
price 
($/barrel) 
Gasoline 
price 
($/gallon) 
Ethanol price 
(without tax 
credit) 
Ethanol price 
(with tax 
credit) 
Stover 
breakeven 
without tax 
credit ($/ton) 
Stover 
breakeven 
with tax 
credit 
($/ton) 
40 1.38 0.92 1.43 9.8 45.5 
50 1.73 1.15 1.66 25.9 61.6 
60 2.07 1.38 1.89 42 77.7 
                                                 
16 Research and development studies suggest that alternative biomass feedstocks (such as switchgrass) and 
processing techniques may yield 85–95 gallons per ton in the future. See Aden and others (2002); Comis 
(2006).  
17 Without the VEETC, the plant could pay a breakeven price of only $42 per ton. 
18 Aden and others  (2002). Other studies—including Gallagher and others  (2003); Hamelinck, van 
Hooijdonk, and Faaij (2005); McAllon and others (2000); and Kaylen and others (2000)—have used other 
approaches to derive cellulosic ethanol production costs and considered alternative feedstocks. 
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70 2.42 1.61 2.12 58.1 93.8 
80 2.76 1.84 2.35 74.2 109.9 
 Source: Miranowski and Irons (2007). 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the importance of both continuation of the VEETC subsidy 
to cellulosic ethanol production and higher crude oil prices to the feasibility of biomass 
ethanol.  The tax credit increases the price ethanol producers can pay for stover by 
$36/ton over without the VEETC option. Every $10 per barrel increase in crude oil prices 
increases the delivered price of stover by $16 per ton.   
From the perspective of the biomass feedstock producer or supplier, the 
breakeven price for the last dry ton of biomass delivered to the biomass processing plant 
is: 
Pfbiomass = CV + CES + CST + Cland            (8) 
where 
 
Pfbiomass = Processor breakeven price per dry ton biomass delivered  
CV = Variable cost of biomass production per ton, including             
 maintenance, nutrient, and harvesting cost 
CES= annualized biomass establishment and seeding costs per ton  
CST = storage, handling, and transport cost per ton biomass delivered 
Cland = land opportunity cost in best alternative crop per ton of     
 biomass delivered. 
 
Obviously, if a market for biomass is going to exist: 
 
 Ppbiomass = Pfbiomass ,              (9) 
 
or the price that the processor is willing to pay per dry ton of biomass at the processing 
plant will have to equal the price that the farmer is willing to accept for a dry ton of 
biomass delivered to the biomass processing plant.  The market will function only if both 
the supplier of biomass and demander for biomass can at least breakeven in a competitive 
market situation.  If not, biomass will not evolve as a sustainable source of renewable 
fuel.   
For our illustration, we calculate the breakeven price for corn stover per ton 
delivered to the stover processing plant. Estimated variable costs are $45 per dry ton.  
Establishment and seeding costs and land opportunity costs are assumed at zero because 
corn grain is already harvested from the same land that provides stover. Transport costs 
are estimated from $10−25 per ton within a 30-mile radius of the plant (DOE and USDA 
2005; English and others 2006). Storage costs are estimated to average $20−45 per ton. 
We use an average of $48 per ton for storage and transport of stover.  Thus the feedstock 
producer would require approximately $93 per ton of dry stover.19  Considering the 
breakeven estimates reported in table 1, it would take both $70 per barrel crude oil and 
the VEETC for a market to develop for corn stover as a biomass feedstock in ethanol 
production using current technology. 
                                                 
19As noted above in footnote 8, POET (formerly Broin Cos.) estimate that they will have to pay farmers 
$100 per ton to harvest, store, and deliver corn cobs, a component of corn stover, to their stover biomass 
processing plant in Iowa. 
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If the landowner grew another biomass crop, such as switchgrass, on Iowa corn 
acres, she would expect to incur an opportunity cost of $250/acre (estimated net returns 
to corn production per acre) in addition to other variable and fixed production costs (Hart 
and Babcock 2007).   
Our conclusion is that corn stover—currently the least-cost biomass feedstock—is 
not competitive with corn grain as an ethanol feedstock at $60 crude oil prices. When 
corn grain is priced at over $4 per bushel and the VEETC is available to biomass ethanol, 
the crude oil price must increase to $70 per dry ton for corn stover to breakeven as an 
ethanol feedstock.  Alternative biomass feedstocks are even less competitive alternatives 
at least in the Midwest where the opportunity cost of using land suitable for corn 
production is high. A case can be made for government research and development 
support in the early stages of new industry development, but continued support once the 
industry becomes established is not warranted unless the marginal social benefits—such 
as environmental gains—clearly outweigh the marginal costs incurred by society.   
 
Impacts of Government Intervention of the U.S. Ethanol Market 
 
We will use the ethanol market model developed above to address several policy 
questions with respect to biofuels: 
 
o How important are tax incentives, environmental regulations, Renewable 
Fuel Standards (RFS), and supply incentives to the ethanol market, and what contribution 
do they make to energy security?  
o How do the impacts of incentives and regulations change under different 
scenarios of petroleum prices, feedstock costs, natural gas prices, and co-product prices? 
o How are producers and consumers impacted by these incentives, 
regulations, and mandates? 
 
Numerous biofuel policy provisions are being considered for the 2007 Farm Bill. 
A USDA 2007 Farm Bill Theme Paper, “Energy and Agriculture,” provides a reasonably 
comprehensive list of suggested options currently being discussed for the Energy Title of 
the 2007 Farm Bill (USDA 2006): 
 
Expand federal direct market intervention to support renewable energy: 
• Raise the level of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). 
• Extend renewable energy tax credits to 2015 or later. 
• Reduce biofuel tax credits when they are not effective in increasing biofuel supply 
or are not needed. 
• Provide accelerated depreciation on renewable energy equipment and facility 
investment. 
• Use more land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) for biomass 
harvesting. 
• Refocus the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Bioenergy Program to support 
biomass used in bioproduct processing. 
 
Expand federal indirect support for renewable energy: 
• Expand the national cellulosic ethanol research initiative. 
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• Expand creative financial engineering to support development of the bio-based 
economy beyond grants, loans, and loan guarantees. 
• Bridge the gap between federally-funded basic research and industry-funded 
applied research and development. 
 
Other groups, including the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2006, p. 9), in 
their report Modernizing America’s Food and Farm Policy: Vision for a New Direction, 
2006, have suggested more limited options:  
The federal government should continue to support research on biofuels as a 
meaningful alternative to unreliable sources of fossil fuel. Current subsidies, in 
combination with support under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, are adequate to seed 
these new industries. Research should focus on new technologies to produce usable 
energy from cellulose or feedstock that can be grown on lesser quality land. Federal 
support programs must insist that as these biofuels industries mature and market 
conditions permit, companies benefiting from biofuel subsidies and import restrictions 
develop business models that ultimately accommodate a scaling back of such federal 
support to levels consistent with those given to other fuel production sectors. 
We will first consider the biofuel direct market intervention provisions for the 
Energy Title of the 2007 Farm Bill.   
 
Raise the Renewable Fuels Standard. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress 
established the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), which requires that 7.5 billion gallons 
of biofuel be blended with gasoline and diesel fuel by 2012. Although rules and 
regulations are being promulgated, most market experts are predicting that the United 
States will surpass the RFS in 2008, given current biofuel production and capacity under 
construction. Proponents of the RFS are proposing that the 7.5 billion gallon RFS be 
raised to 15 billion gallons by 2012 or 2015.  
It is difficult to assess the potential impact of a higher RFS for a number of 
reasons. First, it is unclear how or if the RFS would be enforced and at what level in the 
distribution system (blenders, wholesalers, retailers). Second, given the rapid expansion 
of ethanol and biodiesel industries, it is anticipated that ethanol and biodiesel production 
will approach 15 billion gallons by 2015 without a higher RFS. 20  The 10 percent ethanol 
blending constraint for conventional gasoline engines may serve as a limiting factor as 
the United States approaches 14−15 billion gallons of production.21  Third, if the RFS is 
enforced and ethanol supplies do not expand as projected, then the market prices of 
ethanol and biodiesel could increase significantly.  Under these circumstances, a 15 
billion gallon RFS could seriously disrupt commodity markets, the livestock industry, 
and trade flow because it is difficult to anticipate a competitive biomass feedstock to 
relieve pressure on the corn and soybean markets.  Fourth, if the excise tax subsidy, 
VEETC, is not continued, the breakeven price in equation 6 that ethanol plants can pay 
for corn decreases to about $2.70 per bushel.  It will be highly unlikely that the United 
States will reach a 15 billion gallon Renewable Fuels Standard without government 
enforcement of the Standard.   
  
                                                 
 
21 Ethanol interests are lobbying EPA to raise the blending constraint to 20 percent, but the auto industry is 
refusing to warrant internal combustion engines that use more than 10 percent blends. 
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Extend, reduce, or modify the Renewable Energy Tax Credit. The VEETC is set to expire 
in 2012 or at the end of the 2007 Farm Bill period. Current proposals include extending 
the tax credit until at least 2015 to avoid having the expiration coincide with the 
expiration of the 2007 Farm Bill. At the same time, concern is being expressed that 
further incentives are unnecessary to continue expansion of the ethanol industry, 
especially in periods of higher gasoline prices. In addition to proposals to extend the 
biofuel tax credit to 2015, there are competing proposals to reduce the biofuel tax credit, 
modify the tax subsidy to vary inversely with the price of gasoline, or eliminate the tax 
subsidy altogether.  
First, extending the biofuel tax credit improves the cost competitiveness of 
biofuels relative to gasoline and diesel fuel as a fuel substitute. A recent CARD study 
employing a breakeven analysis and the FAPRI model concluded that the long-run corn-
ethanol market equilibrium output would be three times higher with the tax incentive than 
without, although no time frame was specified (El Obeid and others 2006).  If the 
objective is to increase biofuel as a share of transportation fuels—such as the “25 x ‘25” 
Initiative22 to have 25 percent renewable fuels by 2025—then not renewing or 
eliminating the energy tax credit could reduce ethanol production capacity by as much as 
20 billion gallons in the long run.  Assuming that the excise tax subsidy is passed from 
blenders back to ethanol producers, and ultimately back to farmers and landowners in 
terms of what ethanol producers can pay for a bushel of corn, excise tax credits allow 
producers to pay approximately $1.50 per bushel more for corn than without excise tax 
credits. 
Second, an inverse tax subsidy (that is, a variable tax subsidy inversely tied to 
crude oil/gasoline price) has also been proposed. The current VEETC is set at $0.51 per 
gallon regardless of the price of oil. Viewing ethanol as a fuel substitute, the current tax 
subsidy may lead to excess profits when oil prices are high and negative returns when oil 
prices are low.  If an inverse tax subsidy were tied to the price of crude oil, say $51 per 
barrel crude oil and a $0.51 per gallon VEETC, for every $1 per barrel increase in crude 
oil price, the VEETC would decrease by $0.01 per gallon, and vice versa. If the price of 
crude oil increased to $61 per barrel, the VEETC would decrease to $0.41 per gallon. 
This would not only reduce firm and industry risk, but ensure net returns to firms in the 
biofuel industry.  Essentially, an inverse tax subsidy sets an ethanol (biofuel) price floor 
and establishes expected returns irrespective of the price of crude oil.  Further, if it is 
assumed that the excise tax credit is passed back to farmers and landowners in terms of 
what ethanol producers can pay for corn, a variable tax credit could essentially serve as 
an expected corn price floor, in lieu of other government payments.  
 
Expand the Energy Title of the 2002 Farm Bill. Section 9006 of the 2002 Farm Bill 
established grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs to assist farmers, ranchers, and rural 
small businesses in purchasing renewable energy systems. From FY 2003 to FY 2005, 
USDA’s Rural Development made available roughly $30 million for 119 biomass grants 
and loans and $10 million for two guaranteed loan programs (USDA 2006).  Given the 
generally small magnitude of these grants and loans, they will have limited impact on 
investment and expansion of the biofuel industry.  For example, if the capital cost of a 50 
million gallon ethanol plant is $75 million and the loan is amortized over 10 years, a $1 
                                                 
22 “25x’25” is a bi-partisan coalition that is supported by several governors and states, as well as several 
U.S. Senators and Representatives. National and state partners include private companies, utilities, 
nongovernmental organizations, and rural groups. For more information, see www.25x25.org.    
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million grant would reduce the capital cost by $0.003 per gallon, or about $0.01 per 
bushel of corn.   
 
Provide accelerated depreciation on renewable energy equipment. Providing special 
accelerated depreciation allowances on renewable energy equipment, similar to fiscal 
provisions for petroleum fuels in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, is another option. This 
provision would stimulate further investment in biofuels when the industry is profitable 
and in an expansionary phase. Yet without having specific details on such provisions, it is 
impossible to determine the potential impact of accelerated depreciation. 
 
Use Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) land for biomass harvesting. Proposals in this 
area include:  not renewing CRP contracts on working lands that can be used to produce 
biofuel feedstock; allowing biomass harvesting on CRP land, but with reduced CRP 
annual payments; and varying annual CRP payments tied to local cash rents to maintain 
land in the CRP base due to environmental and wildlife benefits.  
If markets work, what is the role of the government in this situation?  If corn is $4 
per bushel, the opportunity cost of keeping land in the CRP is higher, and landowners 
will not renew the contracts unless they perceive sufficient non-monetary benefits to 
make up the difference between net returns from corn production and CRP rental 
payments. When markets do not work, who is the ultimate loser? Although estimating the 
costs and benefits is complicated, we use examples to illustrate. Not renewing CRP 
contracts on potential working lands that can be used to produce corn will cause a small 
increase in corn supply, may increase net returns to former CRP landowners who convert 
CRP lands to corn production, have a small impact on the supply of renewable fuels, and 
drive corn prices to the same long-run equilibrium market price estimated in the 
breakeven analysis using equation 6.  Except for a possible small short-run impact on the 
cost of livestock feed, this proposal in the long run will leave livestock producers no 
better off in terms of feed costs and will increase soil erosion, decrease water quality, and 
destroy wildlife habitat.  The small short-term benefits will be quickly offset by longer-
term social and environmental costs.  
With respect to the second proposal—allowing biomass harvesting on CRP land, 
but with reduced CRP annual payments—it is difficult to determine if there is any gain in 
social welfare. Under current technology, the U.S. DOE and USDA (2005) estimates that 
it costs about $35 per dry ton for harvesting, storing, and transporting biomass within a 
30 mile radius of a processing plant. One dry ton of stover under current technology 
would yield about 70 gallons of ethanol and cost about $.50 per gallon on average for 
biomass harvesting, storing, and transporting within 30 miles of the biomass conversion 
plant. We have derived independent estimates in the range of $0.75 to 1.50 per dry ton 
range (Miranowski and Irons 2007). Further, there will be wildlife, erosion, and water 
quality costs associated with biomass harvesting. Additionally, the landowner wants to 
capture some rents to offset the reduction of CRP payments and cover the costs incurred 
in “producing” biomass (nutrients and soil, as well as foregoing the non-monetary 
benefits associated with CRP land).   
Variable annual CRP payments tied to local cash rental values, or the opportunity 
cost of CRP land in its next best use, would be a way to retain land in the CRP and 
capture water quality and wildlife habitat values.   
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Redirect Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Bioenergy Program to support biomass. 
The CCC Bioenergy Program, which expired in 2006, provided CCC feedstock to ethanol 
plants in their first year of operation to reduce operating costs during the start-up period. 
The program has evolved into providing payments in lieu of commodity feedstock. The 
proposal is not to continue the program that expired in 2006, but rather to redirect 
payment to plants utilizing biomass feedstock in order to reduce feedstock cost in the 
infant industry. Such a proposal may make biomass feedstock more competitive and 
stimulate investment in biomass technologies during the industry’s learning phase. At the 
current stage of lignocellulosic technology development, with a lack of sound cost data, it 
is difficult to evaluate the impact of such provisions on improving the biomass 
competitiveness with the starch fermentation process in ethanol production.  
 
Expand federal indirect (research) support for renewable energy. Expanding research 
support for renewable energy, especially lignocellulosic conversion of agricultural 
residues and biomass crops, may have significant returns if directed to major bottlenecks 
in the biofuel production process from biomass feedstock. At the same time, equation 9 
indicates that—with the exception of corn stover—biomass feedstock is far more costly 
to supply than biomass ethanol plants can afford to pay the suppliers. USDA and DOE 
already have a number of research programs directed at both basic and applied industry 
research, as does the biofuel industry, often in cooperation with universities. Although 
there is a strong public good argument for expanding these public research efforts, the 
large-scale economic feasibility of biomass feedstock is not within the near term.  
Finally, the case for more funding of technology transfer in order to get basic public 
sector research transferred to the private sector is less strong. In many university research 
facilities, industry, government, and university activities are already integrated, and the 
approach of choice may be to fund joint research and development efforts to reduce 
various production cost components. Along this line, several government grant programs 
available to universities for biofuel technology research already require industry 
participation as a condition of funding.   
 
Conclusion 
 
A basic question needs to be asked with respect to economic policy analysis. Is our 
energy and environmental policy objective to maximize social welfare or is it to transfer 
income between different groups and resource owners in society? If our objective in 
energy and environmental policy intervention is to maximize social welfare, we need to 
improve energy security and reduce dependence on foreign oil, reduce GHG emissions 
and other air quality issues, and reduce federal budget exposure on farm and rural 
development programs that accomplish that in the most efficient way possible. The 
objective pursued in this paper is to maximize net social benefits when considering all the 
social costs and benefits of intervention. If this is not our policy objective, economic 
benefit cost analysis has little to contribute. 
 
The key findings of this policy analysis are: 
 
• Ethanol and biofuels have made a contribution to improving energy security, 
reducing greenhouse gas and air quality emissions, and reducing federal budget exposure, 
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especially recognizing that there is no single solution to the energy security, GHG 
emissions, or budget exposure problems. 
• These social benefits have come at modest costs. However, the marginal costs of 
government incentives to expand biofuel use may be outweighed by the marginal costs in 
the future. We do not have sufficient benefit data to determine at what point in biofuel 
expansion will the marginal costs outweigh the marginal benefits. 
• Even though expansion of corn-based ethanol may have important social costs, 
biomass feedstock has major economic and technical hurdles to overcome before it can 
be competitive with corn-based ethanol. 
• The impact of raising the RFS depends on several factors. First, if the VEETC is 
retained, the nation will come close to producing and consuming 15 billion gallons of 
ethanol by 2012–15, assuming crude oil price stays at $60 per barrel or higher. Second, if 
the VEETC is not continued, biofuel use will likely be about 7.5 billion gallons and an 
enforced 15 billion gallon RFS will be needed to achieve that target. Further, going to 
biofuel mandates of 37 billion gallons in 2015 or even 36 billion gallons in 2022 will be 
costly. Marginal costs will exceed marginal benefits.   
• Extending the VEETC will have costs in the area of $7 billion by 2015. Using a 
modified variable tax credit could reduce budget exposure (depending on the base level 
established), would insure within a range the price of ethanol and corn, but would still 
involve transfer payment to the ethanol and corn industry. 
• Expanding the energy title of the 2002 Farm Bill to include additional rural 
development funding for biofuels would have a small impact on budget exposure but may 
have limited impact on biofuels expansion. First, the magnitude and nature of funding are 
not likely to have a major impact on current ethanol plant investment decisions, 
especially when much of the investment is coming from outside the community. Second, 
modern, large biofuel plants no longer have the employment potential of plants that were 
built before 2006 that were smaller and more labor intensive.  
• Modification of the CRP is going to have few if any marginal benefits and could 
impose significant social costs on the environment and local amenities. 
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Appendix for U.S. Fuel Ethanol Demand and Supply Model Estimation 
 
There are three demands for ethanol: as a fuel substitute, as an octane enhancer, and as an 
oxygenate enhancer.  To capture these effects, the ethanol demand function can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
D
tt
G
t
E
tDD
E
t CAAAGDPPPQ εαββγα +++++= 121 lnlnlnln                            (1) 
 
where   = U.S. fuel ethanol production per month (thousand gallons)                EQ
EP  = U.S. average monthly fuel ethanol rack terminal price (dollars/gallon) 
           GP  = U.S. average monthly gasoline retail sellers price (dollars/gallon)                            
  = U.S. seasonally adjusted monthly GDP (billions of chained 2000                                      
  dollars) 
GDP
      = dummy accounting for the winter months (1 for November–April) CAAA
 
Corn grain is the most important variable cost component for ethanol production.  
Ethanol production from corn accounts for 94 percent of all the ethanol plant operations 
and corn cost accounts for as much as two-thirds of ethanol value, according to Tiffany 
and Eidman (2003).  Ethanol production yields co-products, and we use co-product feed 
prices to capture this effect.  We also introduce a time trend in an effort to capture the 
impact of time-dependent effects, including technological progress and government 
regulations. Ethanol supply can be formally expressed as follows: 
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where  = U.S. fuel ethanol production per month (thousand gallons) EQ
          EP  = U.S. average monthly fuel ethanol rack terminal price (dollars/gallon) 
          CP  = U.S. average monthly corn price (dollars/bushel) 
          CGFP  = U.S. average monthly corn gluten feed price (dollars/short ton) 
           t  = time trend accounting for possible technological progress and/or accumulated  
effects of government CAAA regulations (1995, 1211995 + , 1221995 + , …,                   
12
52006 +  ). 
 
Assuming the ethanol market clears, the quantity demanded will equal the 
quantity supplied: 
 
E
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E QQQ == ,                  (3)                               
 
where  = U.S. monthly fuel ethanol production (thousand gallons). EQ
 
Because we are using a system of simultaneous equations where ethanol price  
and quantity  are endogenously determined, neither the demand nor the supply 
equation satisfies the assumptions of the classical regression model.  Therefore, we use 
an instrumental variable/two-stage least squares approach to estimate the ethanol market 
EP
EQ
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model.  Additionally, the system of equations is complete, there are no identification 
problems, and all coefficients can be estimated.  
The results of our estimation are as follows for the demand equation: 
 
)4(1544298.0ln543392.2ln05638.1ˆln8917864.0842314.4ˆln t
G
t
E
t
E
t CAAAGDPPPQ +++−−=
t-value      (-2.08)        (-2.25)                (3.59)               (7.49)                     (3.75)  
 
For the supply equation, the results are: 
 
)5(.1188042.0ln2793837.0ln3594913.0ˆln2862548.06933.226ˆln tPPPQ CGFt
C
t
E
t
E
t ++−+−=
t-value    (-12.81)        (2.42)                 (-2.45)                  (2.32)                       (13.56) 
 
As can be seen, the coefficients of the demand and supply equations all possess 
the correct signs and all coefficients are significantly different from zero at a high level of 
confidence.   
The 2006 estimated demand and supply curves are plotted as in figure A-1. 
 
 Figure A-1. Ethanol Demand and Supply Estimates, 2006 
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Source: Miranowski and Aukanagul (2007). 
 
 
The demand for fuel ethanol and the supply of fuel ethanol are estimated based on 
the following information obtained from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics 
Service, DOE Energy Information Administration, U.S. Bureau Economic Analysis, 
Oxy-fuel News Price Reports, and Renewable Fuel News Price Reports.   
 
Data 
 
• U.S. fuel ethanol oxygenate production at oxy plant (thousand gallons)  
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(monthly, Jan. 1995–May 2006)                    
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/m_epooxe_yop_nus_1m.htm 
log of US fuel ethanol oxygenate production at 
oxy plant
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• U.S. average fuel ethanol rack terminal price (dollars/gallon) 
(monthly, Jan. 1995–May 2006) 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=32874&cfc=1 
            http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=68404 
log of US average fuel ethanol rack terminal price
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• U.S. conventional gasoline23 retail sales by all sellers price (dollars/gallon) 
(monthly, Jan. 1995–May 2006) 
            http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/d160600002m.htm 
log of US conventional gasoline retail sales by all 
sellers price
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• U.S. seasonally adjusted annual rates GDP (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 
(quarterly, 1995Q1–2006Q2)24
            http://www.econstats.com/gdp/gdp__q1.htm 
     
log of seasonally adjusted monthly rates GDP in 
billions of chained 2000 dollars
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• U.S. average corn price (dollars/bushel) 
(monthly, Jan. 1995–May 2006) 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/PullData_US.jsp 
log of US average corn price
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
00
Ja
n-
01
Ja
n-
02
Ja
n-
03
Ja
n-
04
Ja
n-
05
Ja
n-
06
date
ln
(p
c)
lpc 
 
 
 
• U.S. corn gluten feed price (dollars/short ton) 
(monthly, Jan. 1995–May 2006) 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/feedgrains/FeedGrainsQueriable.aspx 
                                                 
23 Conventional gasoline excludes oxygenated or reformulated gasoline.  See the following Web site for 
more details: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_pri_refmg2_tbldef2.asp. 
 
24 Since the U.S. monthly GDP cannot be obtained, the quarterly value at an annual rate is divided by 
twelve to get the average monthly value.  This average monthly value is then used for each month in the 
quarter. 
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